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INTRODUCTION

On the day the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) became effective in October of that
year, the nation's courts were forced to begin the process of answering a lengthy list of legal questions created by the new legislation.'
Then, in July 2006, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals caught the
attention of consumer bankruptcy law practitioners nationwide with
its decision in In re Cortez.2 The Fifth Circuit's decision in Cortez
added another important question to this list.
At issue in Cortez was the pre-BAPCPA version of 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b), a provision that allowed a bankruptcy court to dismiss a
Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy relief if the granting of the relief
would have constituted a "substantial abuse" of the nation's bankruptcy laws.' The court of appeals was faced with deciding whether
a court passing judgment on a motion to dismiss under § 707(b)
could consider a post-petition change in the debtor's financial
circumstances in deciding whether to grant the motion to dismiss,
or whether the court could only consider the financial condition of
the debtor as it existed on the day the debtor's petition for bankruptcy relief was filed. The Fifth Circuit, like the district court
before it, held that post-petition changes in the debtor's financial
circumstances could be considered under § 707(b), a reversal of the
bankruptcy court's ruling on the issue.4

1. For an overview of the major decisions interpreting the BAPCPA's provisions in 2005
and 2006, see George H. Singer, The Year in Review: Case Law Developments Under the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer ProtectionAct of 2005, 82 N.D. L. REV. 297
(2006).
2. 457 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2006). One commentator referred to Cortez as "a case of first
impression in the nation." John Council, Employment Status Change Nixes Chapter 7
Bankruptcy, TEX. LAW., July 31, 2006, at 1.
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000), amended by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, 27-32 (to be codified at 11
U.S.C. § 707(b)). The Fifth Circuit was forced to apply pre-BAPCPA law because the petition
for bankruptcy relief at issue in Cortez was filed on April 8, 2004; only those petitions filed on
or after October 17, 2005 are subject to the changes made by the BAPCPA. See Cortez, 457
F.3d at 450.
4. See Cortez, 457 F.3d at 450.
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In so doing, the court expressly declined to discuss the effect that
applying post-BAPCPA law would have had on its holding.5 The
Fifth Circuit's decision, coupled with the considerable changes made
to § 707(b) by the BAPCPA,6 has thus created another issue for
courts interpreting the new text of the Bankruptcy Code to consider.
The question of whether a debtor's post-petition financial changes
can be considered under § 707(b) is an important one that must be
resolved properly. Although a debtor will rarely benefit from a postpetition increase in income, such as existed in Cortez, this scenario
has already arisen again in connection with at least two different
Chapter 7 cases.7 Even more important, however, is the potential
impact that considering Chapter 7 debtors' post-petition financial
changes will have in other situations, such as when debtors desire
to reduce their expenses in troubled financial times. Fear of
jeopardizing their bankruptcy petition may force these debtors to
abstain from making small, sensible reductions in their monthly
expenses until after their petition for bankruptcy relief is granted.'
Despite the importance of resolving this point of law, the
bankruptcy courts that have been tasked with deciding whether to
consider post-petition events in connection with all or part of the
new § 707(b) have reached different conclusions, and even some of
those courts in agreement on certain results have reached their
conclusions in different ways. The current bankruptcy literature,
meanwhile, also fails to resolve the issue. Although the new § 707(b)
has been the subject of some scholarly attention, the journal articles
that have been written about the section do not discuss whether
post-petition events should be considered under the provision.9 As
5. See id. at 458 n.1 1 ("In so holding, we do not opine on the effects of the amendments
to § 707(b) Under the 2005 Act.").
6. See infra Part III.
7. See In re Henebury, 361 B.R. 595 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (considering a petition for
bankruptcy relief filed by husband and wife, each of whom secured higher-paying employment
after filing); In re Pak, 343 B.R. 239 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (considering a petition for

bankruptcy relief by another debtor who secured employment after filing the petition).
8. See infra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
9. See David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005,
15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223 (2007); Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching

Can-Pay Debtors:Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665 (2005);
John A. E. Pottow, The Totality of the Circumstancesof the Debtor's FinancialSituationin a
Post-MeansTest World. Trying To Bridge the Wedoff/Culhane & White Divide, 71 Mo. L. REV.
1053 (2006); Eugene R. Wedoff, JudicialDiscretion To Find Abuse Under Section 707(b)(3),

2007]

LOOKING FORWARD WHILE LOOKING BACK

339

a result, the law on this point is quite unsettled and awaiting
comprehensive assessment.
This Note explores the issue of whether a court applying postBAPCPA law can consider a post-petition change in a debtor's
financial circumstances while ruling on a motion to deny Chapter 7
bankruptcy relief under § 707(b). Part I provides a background
discussion of Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief, including a discussion of
the evolution of § 707(b) from its initial version, adopted in 1984, to
the version that applied in Cortez. Part II details the facts that gave
rise to the Cortez decision, as well as the legal arguments made on
both sides of the case. Part III introduces the relevant changes the
BAPCPA made to § 707(b). Part IV then analyzes whether a debtor's
post-petition financial changes can be considered in each of the
three ways post-BAPCPA courts can find abuse under the new
§ 707(b). It concludes that post-petition changes cannot be considered in performing § 707(b)'s "means test" calculations, but that
they can be considered to rebut the presumption of abuse that can
arise under the means test. It also concludes that courts can
consider post-petition changes to determine whether a Chapter 7
petition was filed in good faith to the extent such changes provide
evidence of the debtor's intent in filing the petition. Finally, it
concludes that Chapter 7 debtors' post-petition financial changes
should be considered under § 707(b)'s "totality of the circumstances"
test. Part V then argues in favor of amending § 707(b) once again to
make a number of changes, including the insertion of a de minimis
rule in two parts of the provision.

71 MO. L. REV. 1035 (2006) [hereinafter Wedoff, Judicial Discretion]; Eugene R. Wedoff,
Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231 (2005) [hereinafter Wedoff, Means
Testing]. The only literature discussing post-petition events in connection with § 707(b)
consists of either short works that collect cases decided under the BAPCPA without providing
significant commentary, accounts of the Cortez case, or a pair of short features on the matter.
For an example of a well-written secondary account of the Cortez case, see Council, supranote
2. The two short features on the Cortezcase were both published in the American Bankruptcy
Institute Journal, a newsletter-style publication of the American Bankruptcy Institute. See
Justin H. Dion, Timing Is Everything ... or Is It?: Cortez Challengesthe "Snapshot"Approach
to Analyzing Abuse Pursuantto § 707(b), AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2006, at 1; Rafael I. Pardo,
Analyzing Chapter 7 Abuse Dismissal Motions Post-BAPCPA:A Reply on Cortez, AM. BANKR.
INST. J., Dec.-Jan. 2007, at 16. Each piece recounts the facts of the Cortez case and speculates
briefly about the importance of the decision on post-BAPCPA cases, but the length of both
features--neither is longer than four pages--leaves a need for a more comprehensive analysis.
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I. CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY RELIEF AND § 707(B)
A. Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Relief
A debtor who receives Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief is given an
immediate and unconditional discharge of personal liability for
certain debts in exchange for surrendering all of his or her assets,
except certain basic assets exempted by statute, to a bankruptcy
trustee for liquidation and distribution to the debtor's creditors.1"
This unconditional discharge given to a consumer debtor in Chapter
7 relief is quite different from the conditional discharge given to a
consumer debtor who pursues Chapter 13 bankruptcy relief. The
latter requires a debtor to commit to repay some or all of his debts
in exchange for retaining all his current assets, both those exempted
under Chapter 7 and those not exempted, and receiving a broader
discharge of debt than is available under Chapter 711
B. Section 707(b)
Congress passed the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.12 Under the initial
version of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor seeking Chapter 7 relief
could have his petition dismissed only for "cause."1 3 Section 707 was
amended in 1984, however, to permit the bankruptcy court hearing
a petition for relief to dismiss the case if the granting of Chapter 7
relief to the debtor would constitute a "substantial abuse" of the
Bankruptcy Code. 14 The adoption of this "substantial abuse" provision, which gave birth to § 707(b), was made for the same reasons
that prompted Congress to adopt the BAPCPA more than twenty
years later: it was added to the Code "as part of a package of
consumer credit amendments designed to reduce perceived abuses"
10. See generally H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 10 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N.
88, 97 (providing background on Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief).
11. See id. (contrasting the relief provided to individual debtors under Chapter 7 with the
relief provided under Chapter 13).
12. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended in scattered section at 11 U.S.C. (2000)).
13. See id. § 707, 92 Stat. at 2606 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 707 (2000)).
14. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 312, 98 Stat. 333, 335 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000)).
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by debtors seeking Chapter 7 relief.15 It was adopted in response "to
concerns that some debtors who could easily pay their creditors
might resort to [C]hapter 7 to avoid their obligations."'"
In the years between its creation in 1984 and its overhaul in
2005, § 707(b) was amended twice. The first amendment, made
in 1986, expanded the scope of § 707(b) to allow United States
trustees to move for dismissal on the grounds of "substantial abuse";
previously, only the court could move for dismissal on this ground.1 7
The second amendment, made in 1998, added the following
language at the end of § 707(b):
In making a determination whether to dismiss a case under this
section, the court may not take into consideration whether a
debtor has made, or continues to make, charitable contributions
(that meet the definition of "charitable contribution" under
section 548(d)(3)) to any qualified religious or charitable entity
or organization (as that term is defined in section 548(d)(4))." s
With the addition of this wording, the whole of § 707(b) amounted
to 139 words.' 9 Despite the section's increased length, however,
15. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 11-12 (quoting 6 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON
707.LH[2], at 707-30 (15th ed. rev. 2002)).
16. Id. at 12 (quoting 6 KING ET AL., supra note 15, 707.04).
17. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 219, 100 Stat. 3088, 3101 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §
707(b) (2000)). After the Act was adopted, creditors and other parties in interest still were not
allowed to file motions under § 707(b). Furthermore, § 707(b) still did not requirebankruptcy
judges and U.S. trustees to file motions under this section, even if they believed granting
Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief would constitute a "substantial abuse." See id.
18. Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105183, § 4(b), 112 Stat. 517, 518 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000)). This language later
played an important role in the Cortez case. See infra notes 44-45 and 58 and accompanying
text.
19. After the 1998 amendment, the section read:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the
United States Trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party in
interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter
whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief
would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be a
presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor. In making
a determination whether to dismiss a case under this section, the court may not
take into consideration whether a debtor has made, or continues to make,
charitable contributions (that meet the definition of "charitable contribution"
under section 548(d)(3)) to any qualified religious or charitable entity or

BANKRUPTCY
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it still left undefined-as it had since 1984-what constituted
"substantial abuse." Also missing was any guidance as to what test
the courts should have applied to determine whether substantial
abuse existed; the courts were told only that there was a presumption against finding "substantial abuse."
As a result of this ambiguity, the handful of circuit courts that
were called on to decide whether "substantial abuse" would have
arisen in the granting of a particular Chapter 7 discharge applied
different tests to decide this issue. Two circuits held that a debtor's
ability to pay his debts, standing by itself, was enough to establish
substantial abuse.2" Other circuits applied a "totality of the circumstances" test, holding that the debtor's ability to repay his debts was
the primary factor to be considered under such a test, but still only
one of several factors. 2 ' Two other circuits applied a hybrid test,
adopting the totality of the circumstances approach, but stating that
even under this test a debtor's ability to repay his debts alone may
still be enough, in some instances, to dismiss a case under § 707(b).22
Eventually, the list of circuits adopting the hybrid version of the
totality of the circumstances approach grew. The Fifth Circuit, after
surveying this landscape of decisions and noting that both the
bankruptcy and district courts chose to embrace the hybrid version
of the test, also embraced this standard.2"
organization (as that term is defined in section 548(d)(4)).
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000).
20. See In re Walton, 866 F.2d 981, 983-84 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that the ability of the
debtor to fund a hypothetical Chapter 13 plan alone can be sufficient reason to dismiss a
Chapter 7 case under § 707(b)); ZoIg v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908,914-15 (9th Cir. 1988)
(stating that "a finding that a debtor is able to pay his debts, standing alone, supports a
conclusion of substantial abuse").
21. See Stewart v. U.S. Trustee (In re Stewart), 175 F.3d 796, 809 (10th Cir. 1999);
Kornfield v. Schwartz (In re Kornfield), 164 F.3d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1999); Green v. Staples (In
re Green), 934 F.2d 568, 572-73 (4th Cir. 1991).
22. See First USA v. Lamanna (In re Lamanna), 153 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1998) ("We adopt
the 'totality of the circumstances' test as the measure of'substantial abuse' under § 707(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code. In doing so, we join the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits in
holding that a consumer debtor's ability to repay his debts out of future disposable income is
not per se 'substantial abuse' mandating dismissal. At the same time, we do not require a
court to look beyond the debtor's ability to repay if that factor warrants the result."); In re
Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 126 (6th Cir. 1989) (adopting the totality of the circumstances approach,
finding that one factor to be considered is the debtor's ability to repay his debts out of future
earnings, and saying "[tihat factor alone may be sufficient to warrant dismissal").
23. See In re Cortez, 457 F.3d 448,456 & n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) ('The Cortezes do not dispute
that this standard applies or ask us to adopt a different test for determining substantial
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II. A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION: INRE CORTEZ
A. Facts of the Case
On April 8, 2004, Carlos Cortez and his wife, Suzanne, filed a
joint petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief.24 In addition to their
petition for relief, the Cortezes filed both the required Schedule I
and Schedule J forms, which asked for a disclosure of current
monthly income and current monthly expenses, respectively. The
Cortezes listed a secured debt of $176,000 on their homestead and
unsecured debts amounting to $85,719, a figure that consisted
mostly of credit card debt.2" The Cortezes also listed their net
monthly income as $4,147 and their total monthly expenses as
$5,320 per month. 2' At the time the petition was filed and the
schedules completed, Carlos Cortez was unemployed and Suzanne
Cortez worked as a nurse, thus all the monthly income listed on
Schedule I was attributable to Suzanne Cortez. In response to an
instruction on the bottom of the Schedule I form that was in effect
at the time and told debtors to "[d]escribe any increase or decrease
of more than 10% in any of the above categories anticipated to occur
within the year following the filing of this document," the Cortezes
wrote that Carlos Cortez "believes he28 will be employed this month,
but he has not started working yet.
Four days after filing their petition for bankruptcy relief, Carlos
Cortez was offered a position as the Human Resource Director for
Aramark Healthcare Management Services.29 He accepted the
position and began working for Aramark on April 26, 2004, earning
an annual salary of $95,000, making his net income $5,896 per
month.3 ° He was also eligible for a company car and a $5,000 signing

abuse. Accordingly, for purposes of this appeal, we will assume, without deciding, that this
is the correct standard.").
24. Id. at 450.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 450-51.
28. Id. at 451.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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bonus after sixty days of employment. 3' After Carlos began working
for Aramark, Suzanne reduced the hours she worked as a nurse
each month, making her new net income about $750 a month.32
Between Carlos's new job and Suzanne's reduced hours, the
Cortezes' net income totaled $6,646 each month, a figure that
exceeded their expenses by $1,325 per month.3 3 The Cortezes
provided documents to the U.S. trustee assigned to their case
reflecting this change in Carlos's employment status and testified
to this effect at the mandatory meeting with their creditors on May
10, 2004. 34 After learning of this change, the U.S. trustee filed a
motion to dismiss the Cortezes' petition under § 707(b) on July 9,
2004, claiming that, as a result of Carlos's new job, the Cortezes
"appear to have the means to repay a substantial portion of their
debts through a Chapter 13 plan," and that it would be a substantial
abuse to grant the Cortezes a Chapter 7 discharge." The Cortezes
filed their response to the motion on July 28, 2004, contending that
because Carlos was unemployed at the time they filed their petition
for Chapter 7 relief, and because it was inappropriate for the court
to consider post-petition events under § 707(b), the court should not
consider Carlos's new job while passing judgment on the trustee's
motion to dismiss.36
B. The Bankruptcy Court's Opinion
Judge Dennis Michael Lynn denied the trustee's motion, holding
that a post-petition change in a debtor's financial circumstances
could not be considered under § 707(b) unless the change was
"clearly in prospect" at the time the debtor's petition for Chapter 7
was filed. 7 Judge Lynn began the explanation of his holding by
citing the statutory presumption that existed in § 707(b) in favor of

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. In re Cortez, 335 B.R. 351, 358 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) (withdrawn at the request of
the court).
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granting Chapter 7 relief and against finding substantial abuse.3 8
3 9 Judge Lynn interpreted the phrase
Then, relying on In re Pier,
"granting of relief' in § 707(b) as referring to an "order for relief,"
which occurs at the commencement of a Chapter 7 case under 11
U.S.C. § 301.40 As a result, Judge Lynn reasoned, "the court's
analysis must focus on whether the order for relief granted on the
Petition Date by operation of section 301 was proper, not whether
substantial abuse would occur if the court were to grant that same
relief for the first time today."'
Judge Lynn's opinion supported this conclusion by arguing that
it was not only consistent with the language of § 301 and § 707(b),
but was also consistent with what he called "the general bankruptcy
policy of using the date of filing as a line in the sand to determine
a party's rights in the case. '42 The opinion went on to say that this
position is "reinforced by Congress's very specific instructions when
post-petition events are to be considered" and cited a list of Bankruptcy Code sections in which Congress explicitly stated that postpetition events are relevant to the matter at issue.43 Judge Lynn
38. See id. at 353-54. Judge Lynn cited to a "leading treatise" for the idea that "the
presumption is an indication that in deciding the issue, the court should give the benefit of
any doubt to the debtor and dismiss a case only when a substantial abuse is clearly present."
Id. at 353 & n.7 (citing 6 KING ET AL., supra note 15, 707.04[5] [a]).
39. 310 B.R. 347, 355 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2004).
40. Cortez, 335 B.R. at 354.
41. Id. Judge Lynn went on to say:
If the court were deciding, on the Petition Date, whether granting the relief
requested by Debtors would constitute a substantial abuse, the court would of
course look to the circumstances as they existed at that moment in time.
Circumstances changed subsequent to the order for relief should, as a general
rule, make no difference simply because the court has the benefit of hindsight.
Id. at 354-55.
42. Id. at 355. Judge Lynn's opinion specifically referenced the automatic stay under § 362
that arises on the petition date, the fact that § 522 determines a debtor's right to exemptions
as of the petition date, the fact that secured claims are determined as of the petition date
pursuant to § 506, the fact that the avoidability of certain transfers under § 547 and § 548 is
dependent on the timing of these transfers in relation to the petition date, the fact that a
creditor's security interest could be avoided under § 544 if the security interest is not
perfected as of the petition date, and the fact that post-petition events could be considered
under § 109(e) only to the extent they shed light on the amount of secured and unsecured debt
actually owed by the debtor at the time the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition. Id. at 355-56.
43. Id. at 356. The opinion pointed out that § 541(a)(5) sets forth clear distinctions as to
which types of property acquired by the debtor after filing a bankruptcy petition are
considered property of the debtor's estate for bankruptcy purposes, that § 1207 and § 1306
provide for inclusion of post-petition income in the estate, and that other sections have
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reasoned that if Congress intended post-petition events to be
considered under § 707(b), then similar language would have been
included in its text.44 The opinion pointed out that some might
read the 1998 addition to § 707(b) relating to charitable contributions as proof Congress intended the courts to consider post-petition
events.45 The opinion, however, construed the "or continues to make"
language in the 1998 amendment as "an instruction not to consider
a particular category of expenses which may appear on a debtor's
schedules, not as evidence that Congress intended the court to
generally
consider post-petition events in the section 707(b) analy''
sis. 46

Finally, the bankruptcy court's opinion discussed the policy
implications of its decision. The opinion argued that this holding
provides "certainty to debtors and creditors and will allow attorneys
to give clients accurate advice regarding the applicability of section
707(b) to a case. '47 It said that holding otherwise would mean a
debtor's eligibility for relief would remain in question until the
deadline for filing a motion to dismiss under § 707(b) passes, a date
that is typically about three months after the petition for relief is
filed.4 ' This position, the court said, would have the undesirable
effect of discouraging a debtor who is unemployed at the petition
date from seeking employment out of fear that getting a job would
jeopardize his bankruptcy petition. 9
The opinion also rejected the related policy argument, made by
the U.S. trustee, that not considering post-petition circumstances
for the purpose of § 707(b) would "foster future abuse by unemployed debtors who, anticipating that they will secure permanent
employment, will forego seeking or accepting employment until
after filing for bankruptcy."5 ° The court concluded that this concern
was not unjustified, but reasoned that its holding provided "protection against the potential for such abuse in the future" because

similar, clear standards for when post-petition events should be considered by the court. Id.
44. Id.
45. For the language of the 1998 amendment, see supra text accompanying note 18.
46. Cortez, 335 B.R. at 356 n.8.
47. Id. at 357.
48. Id. at 357 & n.10.
49. Id. at 357.
50. Id. at 356.
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events clearly in prospect at the time of filing could be considered
under § 707(b). 1
C. The Appeal
On March 9, 2005, the district court reversed the bankruptcy
court, distinguishing the case from Pier and concluding that the
wording of the 1998 amendment to § 707(b) made clear that postpetition events should be considered while hearing a motion to
dismiss under the section.5 2 The Cortezes appealed this decision to
the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit issued its opinion on July 20, 2006. 53 Siding
with the district court in overruling the bankruptcy court, the Fifth
Circuit's opinion contained five arguments in favor of considering
post-petition changes under § 707(b). First and foremost, the court
took issue with the bankruptcy court's determination that the
phrase "granting of relief' in § 707(b) meant the order for relief that
takes place at the beginning of the case.54 In reaching this conclusion, the court found that the words "would be" that follow "granting
of relief' in the text of § 707(b) indicated that the subsection only
applies to an event that will take place in the future, namely the
discharge of a petitioner's debts under Chapter 7 that ends a
bankruptcy case, not an event that took place in the past, namely
the order for relief that was granted at the beginning of the case.55
The court further supported this conclusion by showing it was
consistent with the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which
delay granting a Chapter 7 discharge while a motion to dismiss
under § 707(b) is pending,5" and with implicit holdings by other

51. Id. The court's opinion defined "clearly in prospect" quite narrowly, however. It
determined Carlos's job was not clearly in prospect on the date of filing, despite the notation
on the Cortezes' Schedule I form that Carlos expected to be employed soon. See id. at 356-57.
The court went on to say that employment would have been clearly in prospect if Carlos had
verbally accepted an offer of employment before the filing date, or even received a letter
offering the position prior to the petition date. Id. at 356.
52. Neary v. Cortez (In re Cortez), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39778, at **6-7 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
9, 2005).
53. In re Cortez, 457 F.3d 448, 448 (5th Cir. 2006).
54. See id. at 454-55 & n.6.
55. Id. at 455.
56. Id.
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circuits.57 The court then finished its explanation of this conclusion
by citing to a passage in Collier on Bankruptcy, which stated: "In
determining whether a substantial abuse exists, there is a presumption in favor of granting the relief sought by the debtor, i.e., a
8
discharge.""
The second argument raised by the court was that the "or
continues to make" wording of the 1998 amendment exempting
charitable contributions shows congressional intent to allow courts
to focus on subsequent developments that occur after the petition
date under § 707(b), except to what charities the debtor is presently
contributing. 9
The thiird argument raised by the court in favor of considering
the post-petition change in the Cortezes' income originated in the
decisions of other circuits tasked with determining how to decide
whether substantial abuse was present in the § 707(b) context. The
court noted that the other circuits that had applied the hybrid
totality of the circumstances test it chose to apply in this case6 ° had
placed an "emphasis on the debtor's ability to repay debts under a
Chapter 13 plan."61 The court then detailed how post-petition
financial changes would be handled under a Chapter 13 plan,
pointing out that in a Chapter 13 proceeding debtors are obligated
to amend their schedules-the same ones that would have been
originally filed in connection with a Chapter 7 case-to include
subsequent income, even if that income was not known or anticipated at the time the petition for Chapter 13 relief was filed.62 In
fact, the court noted, even if a Chapter 13 plan is confirmed as
initially proposed, the plan can be modified later based on a change
in the debtor's income." Based on these principles, the court
concluded that, because it was required to look to whether a debtor
57. See Cortez, 457 F.3d at 455 (citing First USA v. Lamanna (In re Lamanna), 153 F.3d
1, 3 (ist Cir. 1998); U.S. Trustee v. Harris (In re Harris), 960 F.2d 74, 75 (8th Cir. 1992)).
58. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 6 KING ET AL., supra note 15,
707.04[5][a]). This
passage was clearly quoted to demonstrate that respected scholarly materials consider the
words "granting of relief' to refer to the discharge of debt that occurs at the end of a Chapter
7 case, not the order for relief that occurs at the beginning of such a case.
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
61. Cortez, 457 F.3d at 456 n.7.
62. Id. at 457.
63. Id. at 457-58 (citing Arnold v. Weast (In re Arnold), 869 F.2d 240, 241 (4th Cir. 1989)).
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would be eligible for Chapter 13 relief under the totality of the
circumstances test in this case, and because post-petition events are
considered in a Chapter 13 proceeding, then post-petition events
had to be considered here as well, "up until the point at which the
[Chapter 7] discharge is entered." 4
The court's next argument took issue with the view that the
Bankruptcy Code generally makes the date a Chapter 7 petition is
filed the critical date for determining the debtor's rights.65 Although
it acknowledged that this is the date used to fix a number of rights
in Chapter 7 cases, such as the automatic stay and entitlements to
exemptions, the court rejected this argument because of the number
of sections under which post-petition circumstances can be considered in a Chapter 7 proceeding.66
Fifth and finally, the court rejected the argument, not raised in
the bankruptcy court opinion, that post-petition earnings cannot be
considered for the purposes of a motion to dismiss under § 707(b)
because they do not constitute property of the debtor's estate for
purposes of a Chapter 7 hearing under § 541(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy
Code. 67 The court concluded that "the ability to exclude post-petition
income for purposes of a Chapter 7 estate is an independent issue
from whether debtors have the ability to repay their debts," and
that "[t]he latter issue is the pertinent inquiry for determining
substantial abuse under § 707(b)."68 The court thus joined the other
circuits that have considered whether exempt property should be
considered for the purposes of a substantial abuse determination in
holding that it is appropriate to do so.69

64. Id. at 458.
65. Id. at 458 n.10.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 458. "Property of the estate" in this context means property that belongs to the
bankruptcy estate. The U.S. trustee typically seizes and sells the property of the estate when
a debtor is given Chapter 7 relief; the proceeds are then used to pay the claims of a debtor's
creditors. See The U.S. Trustee's Role in Consumer Bankruptcy Cases, httpj/www.usdoj.gov/
ust/eo/public.affairs/factsheet/docs/fsO5.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
68. Cortez, 457 F.3d at 458.
69. Id. (citing Taylor v. United States (In re Taylor), 212 F.3d 395, 397 (8th Cir. 2000));
Kornfield v. Schwartz (In re Kornfield), 164 F.3d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1999)).
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III. BAPCPA AND THE NEW § 707(b)
A. CongressionalIntent Behind the BAPCPA
In early 2005, years of effort on the part of Congress and the
consumer credit lobby resulted in the passage of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. ' 0 The bill's
stated purpose was "to improve bankruptcy law and practice by
restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy
system and ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and
creditors."7 1 The legislative history accompanying the BAPCPA
makes clear that Congress thought that fairness to creditors was
drastically lacking in the existing version of the Bankruptcy Code,
and, as a result, Congress sought to make it significantly harder for
consumers to get bankruptcy relief, all in the name of curbing
bankruptcy abuse.7 2 To do this, the BAPCPA overhauled much of
the Bankruptcy Code, and the "heart of the bill's consumer bankruptcy reforms" was incorporated into § 707(b).73
B. The New § 707(b)
Section 102 of the BAPCPA made major changes to § 707(b),
expanding the section from 139 words to 2,349 words. 74 Despite its
newfound length, however, the section still fails to expressly answer
the question that was at issue in Cortez: whether courts should
consider a debtor's post-petition financial changes when hearing a
motion to dismiss the debtor's petition for Chapter 7 relief under §
70. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 6-10 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 9296 (discussing recent attempts to change the nation's bankruptcy laws).
71. Id. at 2.
72. To support this assertion, the House Report accompanying the BAPCPA cited
statistics showing there had been a surge in consumer bankruptcy filings in recent years and
concluded that these filings were "part of a generally consistent upward trend." Id. at 3. The
report also cited evidence that a significant number of debtors granted Chapter 7 relief had
the ability to repay their debts. See id. at 5 & n.18.
73. Id. at 2 ("The heart of the bill's consumer bankruptcy reforms consists of the
implementation of an income/expense screening mechanism ('needs-based bankruptcy relief
or 'means testing'), which is intended to ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum
they can afford."). This means test is contained in the new § 707(b).
74. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b) (West 2006).
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707(b).7 5 But much of the rewritten section's text does shed new
light on the issue, and thus makes a new analysis of the question
necessary.
The first notable change is that a court is no longer required to
find "substantial abuse" in order to dismiss a Chapter 7 proceeding
under § 707(b); it now need only find "abuse. '76 Another change that
affects the entire section was also accomplished by a removal of
wording: the presumption in favor of granting a Chapter 7 petition
for debt relief is no longer present in the section.7 7
In its place, however, Congress created a presumption of abuse
that arises if the debtor's "current monthly income," after subtracting for certain specified monthly expenses and multiplying by sixty,
is either (1) equal to or greater than the lesser of 25 percent of the
debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or $6,000,
whichever is greater; or (2) $10,000, unless special circumstances
exist that rebut the presumption of abuse.7 8 According to the
Bankruptcy Code, current monthly income:
[Mleans the average monthly income from all sources that the
debtor receives (or in a joint case the debtor and the debtor's
75. As noted by the opinions in the Cortez matter, the absence of such language is not
typical. The Bankruptcy Code generally states whether post-petition changes should or should
not be considered in any given section where the issue could be in doubt. See supranotes 4244, 65-66 and accompanying text.
76. See § 707(b)(1). This change may be more symbolic than substantive, however. One
bankruptcy treatise, in commenting on this change, says: "It is unclear how much impact this
will have; few, if any, courts permitted a [C]hapter 7 case to proceed because they found it to
be an abuse, but not a substantial abuse, under prior law." 6 ALAN N. RESNICK & HENRY J.
SOMER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 707.0511] (15th. ed. rev. 2006). As an aside, this section
also now gives the courts a choice between dismissing a Chapter 7 case or, with the debtor's
permission, converting it to a Chapter 11 or 13 case. See § 707(b)(1).
77. See § 707(b)(1).
78. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)-(D)(ii). If the calculations required under the means test give
rise to a presumption of abuse that is not rebutted, then the debtor's Chapter 7 petition must
be dismissed or converted to a Chapter 11 or 13 case. Not much guidance is given to the courts
to determine what sort of special circumstances are sufficient to rebut the presumption. All
that the text of § 707(b) says is that the presumption of abuse that arises under the means
test "may only be rebutted by demonstrating special circumstances, such as a serious medical
condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed Forces, to the extent such special
circumstances that justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for
which there is no reasonable alternative." Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i). Even after considering these
special circumstances, however, the presumption of abuse can still only be rebutted if the
debtor "passes" the means test after taking account of these new figures. Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(iv).
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spouse receive) without regard to whether such income is
taxable income, derived during the 6-month period ending on(i) the last day of the calendar month immediately preceding the date of the commencement of the case if the debtor
files the schedule of current income required by section
521(a)(1)(B)(ii); or
(ii) the date on which current income is determined by the
court for purposes of this title if the debtor does not file
the schedule of current income required by section
521(a)(1)(B)(ii); and
(B) includes any amount paid by any entity other than the
debtor (or in a joint case the debtor and the debtor's
spouse), on a regular basisfor the household expenses of
the debtor or the debtor's dependents (and in a joint case
the debtor's spouse if not otherwise a dependent), but
excludes benefits received under the Social Security Act,
payments to victims of war crimes or crimes against
humanity on account of their status as victims of such
crimes, and payments to victims of international terrorism
(as defined in section 2331 of title 18) or domestic terrorism
(as defined in section 2331 of title 18) on account of their
status as victims of such terrorism.79
Should this presumption of abuse either be rebutted or otherwise
not apply, however, the new § 707(b) gives further clarification to
the courts about how they should look for "abuse.""s Courts should
consider either "whether the debtor filed the petition in bad faith"
or whether "the totality of the circumstances (including whether the
debtor seeks to reject a personal services contract and the financial
need for such rejection as sought by the debtor) of the debtor's
financial situation demonstrates abuse."'" Also notable, given the
disagreement between the bankruptcy court and the Fifth Circuit
over the meaning of "granting of relief' in Cortez, 2 is the fact that
the BAPCPA retained the "granting of relief' wording in the same
part of § 707(b) as it appeared before, 3 but inserted the phrase

79. See 11 U.S.C.A § 101(10A) (West 2006).

80. See § 707(b)(3).
81. Id. § 707(b)(3)(A)-(B).
82. See supranotes 54-58 and accompanying text.
83. See § 707(b)(1).
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"order for relief' in three other parts of the section.' Finally, the
disputed language of the 1998 amendment to the section exempting
charitable contributions was also retained in § 707(b)(1). 5
IV. CONSIDERING POST-PETITION EVENTS UNDER THE NEW

§ 707(b)

A. Post-PetitionChanges Irrelevant Under Means Test
The question of whether a post-petition change in the financial
circumstances of a debtor seeking Chapter 7 relief should be
considered under the "means test" contained in the new § 707(b) has
already created a disagreement among the courts that have
considered the issue.86 Given the complexity of the section's new
wording, this is not surprising. Still, this dispute is easily resolved
after taking a closer look at the text of § 707(b)(2), the portion of the
section containing the means test.
Although § 707(b)(2) may be quite complex, this complexity yields
a statute that provides a clear formula for determining whether a
presumption of abuse should arise, and this formula has only two
"current monthly income" and the debtor's
variables: the debtor's
"monthly expenses."87 If income a debtor receives does not fall
84. See id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I), 707(b)(6), 707(b)(7)(A). The phrase "granting of relief' was
also inserted in 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i), 707(b)(3). The fact that Congress distinguished
between the phrases "order for relief' and "granting of relief' in the text of the new section
clearly affirms the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in the Cortez matter that the phrase
"granting of relief' does not refer to the "order for relief." See supra notes 54-58 and
accompanying text.
85. See § 707(b)(1).
86. This dispute has arisen over the question of how to handle the expenses associated
with repayment of secured claims that are listed on the debtor's schedules at the time of the
bankruptcy filing when the debtor expresses an intention to abandon the collateral securing
the debt. The courts have handled this factual scenario in one of three ways. See infra Part
IV.A.2. A number of bankruptcy courts also have been called on to decide if the language of
the means test in § 707(b) allows for consideration of a debtor's post-petition financial changes
in connection with Chapter 13 cases since the section is cross-referenced in a provision
governing Chapter 13 cases. See, e.g., In re Love, 350 B.R. 611 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2006).
Because this analysis is primarily dependent on the wording of sections that only govern
Chapter 13 cases, however-and is of no real value in determining whether this part of §
707(b) should consider post-petition changes in a debtor's financial affairs because the clear
and plain wording of the means test precludes consideration of factors other than income and
expenses-these cases need not be evaluated here. An analogy to Chapter 13 cases is useful
when evaluating the totality of the circumstances test, though. See infra Part IV.D.
87. See supranotes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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within the definition of "current monthly income," no mechanism
exists for including it in this section's means test. The same is true
for any expense the debtor incurs; only those expenses that fall
within the definition of "debtor's monthly expenses" can be considered in the formula that triggers a presumption of abuse.88
Therefore, the required analysis to determine whether debtors'
post-petition financial changes can be considered under the means
test is really a two-part inquiry: the courts must inquire into
whether one or both of the definitions given to "current monthly
income" and "debtor's monthly expenses" are broad enough to
encompass a post-petition change in the respective category.
1. Post-PetitionChanges Not Used To Calculate "Current
Monthly Income"
Congress set forth a detailed explanation of "current monthly
income," given above.89 Income from any and all sources falls within
this definition, including income that is not considered taxable
income by the Internal Revenue Service. As broad as this definition
of the "income" part of "current monthly income" is, though, it is
reined in significantly by the "current monthly" part of "current
monthly income": to qualify, the income must have been derived
during the previous six-month period "ending on the last day of the
calendar month immediately preceding the date of the commencement of the case," as long as the debtor files the schedule of current
income required by § 521(a)(1)(B)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code.9"
The wording is clear: for the purposes of the means test, Congress
only intended current monthly income to include the average
monthly income earned by the debtor in the six full calendar months
before the commencement of the bankruptcy case. Thus, if a debtor
has an average monthly income of $950 in the months January
through June, but on July 3 gets a new job paying $2,000 a month,
88. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
89. See supra text accompanying note 79.
90. See supra text accompanying note 79. If the schedule of current income is not filed,
however, the door appears to be opened to allowing in post-petition financial changes. Section
101(10A)(ii) gives the bankruptcy court the right to determine the date on which current
monthly income is determined if a debtor fails to file a timely schedule of current income. See
11 U.S.C.A. § 101(10A)(ii) (West 2006).
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and on July 5 files a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief, the
debtor's current monthly income, for the purposes of the means test,
remains $950. The same result obviously also applies to income
from a new job taken even later, after the commencement of the
bankruptcy case. The simple fact of the matter is that no other
provision exists that trumps this definition of current monthly
income; the definition is drafted in such a mechanical manner that
neither equitable principles nor judicial construction can modify it.9 1
2. Post-PetitionChanges Not Used To Calculate "Debtor's
Monthly Expenses"
The phrase "debtor's monthly expenses" is defined in §
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(iv).9 2 Although clause (iv) does not provide any
insight into the question of whether Congress intended for a postpetition change in a debtor's monthly expenses to be considered
under the means test, clauses (ii) and (iii) are dispositive on the
issue. Clause (ii)(I) provides, in relevant part:
The debtor's monthly expenses shall be the debtor's applicable
monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor's actual monthly
expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary
Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area in
which the debtor resides, as in effect on the date of the order for
relief, for the debtor, the dependents of the debtor, and the
spouse of the debtor in a joint case, if the spouse is not otherwise
a dependent. 3
The key wording in this clause is the phrase "as in effect on the
date of the order for relief." As discussed above, Congress clearly
distinguished the order for relief, which occurs upon the filing of a
91. The view that the means test was drafted this way was explicitly expressed by the
court in In re Hartwick, 352 B.R. 867, 870 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006) ("[C]oncepts of fairness
involve equitable principles and judicial discretion. Congress had neither of these in mind in
enacting the means test in 11 U.S.C. § 707(b).... Congress has already determined the fairness
of application of the means test, and a major objective of the legislation was to remove judicial
discretion from the process.").
92. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(iv) (West 2006).
93. Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (emphasis added).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:335

Chapter 7 petition, from the granting of relief, which occurs at the
end of a Chapter 7 case, in the text of the new § 707(b).94
The question that then arises is: what did Congress intend this
wording to modify? A careful reading of the clause suggests that
Congress intended this phrase to mean that, for the purposes of the
means test, two things should be considered to remain the same as
they were on the date of the order for relief: first, the debtor's
applicable monthly expense amounts under the National and Local
Standards established by the Internal Revenue Service,95 and,
second, the debtor's actual monthly expenses that would fall into the
categories specified as "Other Necessary Expenses" by the IRS. That
is, the clause freezes the debtor's expenses as they were on the date
of the order for relief; it does not, as a careless reading of the clause
might infer, freeze the National and Local Standards and categories
listed as other necessary expenses that were in place on that date. 96
Section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) also gives proof of Congress's intention to
ignore post-petition changes in a debtor's expenses in the means
test. The clause provides, in relevant part: "The debtor's average
monthly payments on account of secured debts shall be calculated
as the sum of ... the total of all amounts scheduled as contractually
due to secured creditors in each month of the 60 months following
the date of the petition ... divided by 60."" 7 To date, the vast majority
of cases that have included a discussion of whether to consider a
debtor's post-petition financial changes under this part of the new
§ 707(b) have involved an interpretation of this clause.
Nearly all of the decisions that have interpreted this language
have properly held it to mean that Congress intended a debtor's
expenses under the means test to include the average monthly
amount that must be repaid over the next sixty months on all
secured debts that are due on the day a Chapter 7 petition for
94. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
95. These are standards used by IRS collection agents when collecting delinquent taxes
from individual taxpayers.
96. This was the conclusion reached by the court in In re Littman, 370 B.R. 820 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 2007). The Littman court was faced with a debtor who was ordered to begin making
monthly child support payments. Because the child support order was entered after the debtor
filed a petition for Chapter 7 relief, the court held that the child support payments could not
be added into the debtor's expenses for the purposes of the means test.
97. § 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) (emphasis added). This petition is the petition for relief that
launches a Chapter 7 case.
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relief is filed.9" Of these opinions, perhaps the best statutory
construction argument is provided by the Walker court, which
conducted a detailed examination of the issue. The Walker court
began its analysis by reasoning:
The Court concludes that the plain language of the statute
permits a reduction from CMI for payments on secured debts
that have not been reaffirmed. Congress' choice of the phrase,
"scheduled as contractually due," suggests that, in determining
which payments should be averaged for the deduction, the Court
should determine how many payments are owed under the
contract for each secured debt at the time of filing. This interpretation gives meaning to the word "scheduled," which implies the
possibility that the payments may not be made as required
under the contract, either because the debtor will surrender the
collateral or because the payments might be modified and paid
through a Chapter 13 plan. If the intent were to permit only
those payments that would actually be made in the post-petition
period, Congress could have specified that the payments to be
deducted are only those payments to be made on secured debts
that the debtor intends to reaffirm.99
The Walker court also reasoned that the use of the phrase
"contractually due" indicates an intent on the part of Congress to
permit a deduction for all secured debts, regardless of whether the
debt is reaffirmed or the collateral is surrendered, because "the
surrender of the collateral does not change the fact that the
payments are 'contractually due.' When a debtor files the bankruptcy petition, the debtor is contractually due for payments on the
outstanding secured debts for the length of the contract."'100

98. See, e.g., In re Kelvie, 372 B.R. 56 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007); In re Hoerlein, 2007 Bankr.
LEXIS 1043 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Apr. 3, 2007); In re Kogler, 368 B.R. 785 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
2007); In re Galyon, 366 B.R. 164 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2007); In re Longo, 364 BR. 161 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 2007); In re Mundy, 363 B.R. 407 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2007); In re Haar, 360 B.R. 759
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); In re Sorrell, 359 B.R. 167 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Nockerts,
357 B.R. 497 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Simmons, 357 B.R. 480 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006);
In re Hartwick, 352 B.R. 867 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006); In re Randle, 353 B.R. 360 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill.
2006); In re Walker, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 845 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006).
99. Walker, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 845, at **10-11.
100. Id. at *12.
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Though the vast majority of courts have reached the same
conclusion as the Walker court, unanimity does not exist on this
issue. In fact, two other lines of authority exist on the issue of
whether and when to consider a post-petition surrender of collateral
securing a debt. The first of these two minority views was expressed
by the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas in In re
Singletary.'° ' The Singletary court, considering the same question
as the Walker court, opened the door for considering the postpetition surrender of collateral securing a debt. The court did this
by holding that the debt secured by the collateral should be
eliminated from a debtor's means test expenses if the surrender is
made before the motion to dismiss based on § 707(b) is filed. °2 The
court reached this conclusion, in large part apparently, because it
believed it was required to follow the Fifth Circuit's opinion in
Cortez, despite the fact that Cortez did not interpret the language at
issue here.0 3 The court did not justify its conclusion by considering
the text of the clause at issue, as in Walker, or by considering the
debtor's argument that because the means test clearly does not
consider post-petition changes in a debtor's income it then should
not consider post-petition changes in expenses." 4 Instead the court
based its holding on a poorly reasoned inference based upon the
amount of time given to the U.S. trustee to file a motion to dismiss
based on the presumption of abuse under the means test.1 0 5 The
court inferred that, because the U.S. trustee is given a certain
number of days to file a motion to dismiss a debtor's Chapter 7
petition based on the presumption of abuse triggered by failing the
means test, Congress must have intended the courts to consider all
changes in all expenses, including secured debts, up until the last
day the motion to dismiss can be filed.' Using this reasoning,
for expenses to be frozen as they stand on the day the petition for
relief is filed, Congress would have had to require a U.S. trustee
to somehow be assigned a Chapter 7 case, read over the debtor's
101. 354 B.R. 455, 473-74 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006).
102. Id. at 458.
103. See id. at 473 ('The Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Cortez requires this Court to
consider post-petition events in any motion brought under § 707(b).").
104. See id. at 464.
105. See id. at 465-66 & n.10.
106. See id. at 465-66.
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schedules, make the appropriate calculations, determine whether
the presumption of abuse is triggered, and file a motion to dismiss
the petition, all on the same day the petition is filed.
This analysis is completely inconsistent with other provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code that freeze circumstances as they exist on the
petition date, yet still allow for motions based on these circumstances to be filed much later. 1° Moreover, the clear wording of the
clause in question in Singletary indicates that Congress did not
intend the means test to consider post-petition changes to the
secured debt of a debtor in a Chapter 7 case, as illustrated by the
court in Walker.' Finally, it seems illogical that Congress would
intend for the means test to ignore post-petition changes in income,
yet consider post-petition changes in expenses-or just one category
of expenses-without clearly articulating that it wishes this to be
the case.' 09 As discussed previously, Congress clearly chose to ignore
changes in a debtor's post-petition income in the means test.1 0
Congress did not clearly state it intended to treat post-petition
expense changes differently in the text of § 707(b), and nothing in
the legislative history accompanying the BAPCPA indicates that
Congress had this intent either; thus, the only rational conclusion
one can reach is that Congress did not intend post-petition changes
in a Chapter 7 debtor's expenses to be considered in the means test,
just as it did not intend such changes in a debtor's income to be
considered.
As noted above, there is a second line of authority holding that a
post-petition surrender of collateral securing a debt, or decision not
to reaffirm the debt, can be considered for the purposes of the means
107. For example, it is settled law that the filing of a petition for bankruptcy relief imposes
a freeze on all efforts by a debtor's creditors to collect on those debts that arose before the
petition date, but not those that arose after the petition date, under the "automatic stay"
provision found in § 362 of the Code. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 2006). Yet § 362(e) allows
creditors to make a motion to end the stay with respect to specific assets throughout the life
of the case. See id. § 362(e).
108. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
109. The debtors in Singletary made an almost identical argument. See supra text
accompanying note 103. Common sense dictates that Congress would not intend to ignore a
post-petition change in the debtor's monthly expenses for the essentials of life under the
means test, yet consider a change in another set of expenses-those pertaining to repayment
of secured debts-under the very same means test, all the while ignoring post-petition
changes in income under the means test.
110. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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test. Unlike the Singletarycourt, however, courts subscribing to this
second minority view hold that the U.S. trustee does not need to
wait to see if the collateral is actually surrendered before removing
the expenses associated with the secured debt from the debtor's
means test calculations; these courts hold that simply declaring an
intent to surrender the collateral or not reaffirm the debt is enough
to require recalculation of the debtor's monthly expenses under the
means test."' The courts that embrace this view defend their
position by either arguing that this holding is "in keeping with the
overall purpose of establishing a formula that will give rise to a
meaningful presumption of abuse""' 2 or arguing that the use of the
word "scheduled" in the phrase "scheduled as contractually due"
means the act of being placed on the debtor's bankruptcy schedules,
and since these schedules must be amended to stay current, the
debt cannot be "scheduled3 as contractually due" if the debtor does
not intend to reaffirm it."
These arguments, although creative, ultimately fail for the same
reasons as the Singletary court's argument. The plain meaning of
§ 707(b)(2)(A)(iii) clearly does not allow for the post-petition
surrender of collateral securing a debt to be considered under the
means test. Concluding otherwise, meanwhile, would be inconsistent with all of the remaining clauses of the means test-those
which form the basis of both the debtor's income and expenses. Not
a single court has held that these other clauses allow for consideration of a debtor's post-petition changes; thus, uniformity requires
the same result for this clause.
3. IgnoringPost-PetitionChanges in the Means Test
CalculationsMakes Good Sense
The idea that the means test should not consider a debtor's postpetition financial changes likely seems inequitable to many sensible
people. After all, why should a debtor be able to get a job paying
$250,000 a year the day after filing a petition for Chapter 7 relief
and have his new earnings be immune from the means test? Anyone
111. See In re Ray, 362 B.R. 680 (Bankr. D. S.C. 2007); In re Harris, 353 B.R. 304 (Bankr.
E.D. Okla. 2006); In re Skaggs, 349 B.R. 594 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2006).
112. Ray, 362 B.R. at 685.
113. See Harris,353 B.R. at 307-10; Skaggs, 349 B.R. at 598-600.
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concluding this result to be inequitable would be correct; this is
inherently inequitable.'1 4
Congress, though, did not intend for the means test to be the
provision in § 707(b) that considers equitable principles. Congress's
inclusion of language allowing courts to consider "the totality of the
circumstances" if the means test does not result in a presumption of
abuse or if the presumption is rebutted reveals the means test for
what it really is: just a formulaic screening mechanism used to
generate a presumption." 5
The means test, far from being the final determinant of whether
Chapter 7 relief should be granted in most truly deserving cases, is
designed only to discourage filings by bankruptcy lawyers whose
clients clearly have the ability to repay their debts. Any argument
from equity should not be made in the application of this mechanical
screening mechanism-it should be made in an attempt to rebut the
presumption of abuse created by it, or under the totality of the
circumstances test contained in § 707(b)(3)(B)." 6
B. Post-PetitionChanges Relevant To Rebut the Presumption of
Abuse Created by the Means Test
As mentioned above, a debtor who fails the means test in § 707(b)
will be subject to a presumption that his petition for Chapter 7
bankruptcy relief is abusive, and this presumption "may only be
rebutted by demonstrating special circumstances, such as a serious
medical condition or a call or order to active duty in the Armed
Forces, to the extent such special circumstances that justify
additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for
114. This belief was also expressed by the court in Hartwick. See In re Hartwick, 352 B.R.
867, 869-70 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2006).
115. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(3)(B) (West 2006). Wedoff views the means test in the same
manner; he considers the means test to be "simply a mechanism for generating a
presumption" that "does not result in any final determination." Wedoff, JudicialDiscretion,
supra note 9, at 1037.
116. The Walker court implicitly made the argument, by referencing the totality of the
circumstances test, that Congress adopted the totality of the circumstances test as a sort of
equitable safety net should a potentially abusive petition for relief survive the means test.
Because the U.S. trustee in the case failed to make a motion under the totality of the
circumstances test, and only moved under the means test, the court did not opine further on
the matter. See In re Walker, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 845, at *25 & n.4 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1,
2006).
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which there is no reasonable alternative.""' It is possible that
Congress did not intend these "special circumstances" to include a
debtor's post-petition financial changes. Congress could have simply
included this provision to allow a debtor who has, for some valid
reason, higher expenses than would be allowed under the IRS
National and Local Standards used to compute the "debtor's
monthly expenses" portion of the means test to escape the presumption of abuse."'
Alternatively, Congress may have intended this provision to help
out someone who lost their job a month before filing their bankruptcy petition. Because such a person's "current monthly income"
would be an average of his previous six months of earnings, it would
be skewed higher than his actual monthly income at the time the
petition is filed and, thus, could result in an unjustified dismissal of
his petition for relief if this special circumstance-the loss of his
job-was not considered to rebut the presumption of abuse that
arises under the means test.
But limiting consideration of a debtor's "special circumstances" to
those that arise prior to the filing of the Chapter 7 petition for relief
would be illogical and unfair, and, unlike in the means test, fairness
clearly matters in this provision. In fact, the only purpose for this
provision is to ensure fairness to debtors. Whereas the means test
presents a formulaic and mechanical test that eschews equitable
arguments, the only possible reason Congress could have included
this "special circumstances" provision is to provide an escape hatch
to debtors who might unfairly fail the means test.
Once this provision is viewed in this manner, it becomes clear
why courts must allow post-petition changes to be considered under
it. Preventing a debtor from raising the fact that, for example, his
deteriorating health requires greater expenditures for medical care
than were required at the time his petition for bankruptcy relief was
filed hardly seems to serve the interests of fairness. Nor would it be
fair for a court to ignore the fact that a debtor first acquired a
completely new expense-such as child support payments-after
filing his petition for Chapter 7 relief."' Nor would it be fair to
117. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
119. See In re Littman, 370 B.R. 820 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) (holding that a debtor who was
ordered to make monthly child support payments after filing his Chapter 7 petition for relief
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ignore any post-petition decrease in a debtor's income. Nothing in
the text of the BAPCPA or the legislative history accompanying the
legislation, meanwhile, runs counter to this conclusion.12 °
C. Post-Petition Changes Relevant To Determine Whether Petition
Filed in Bad Faith
In the event that the presumption of abuse does not arise under
the means test or is rebutted, § 707(b)(3)(A) requires courts to
consider whether the debtor filed his petition for relief "in bad faith"
or if the "totality of the circumstances" indicates that the granting
of bankruptcy relief would be an abuse of the Bankruptcy Code. 2'
The Bankruptcy Code does not define "bad faith," but one postBAPCPA bankruptcy court has already held that post-petition
actions by a debtor can be considered when conducting an inquiry
into the debtor's good faith under § 707(b). The court's analysis in
this decision, In re Oot,'22 shows that post-BAPCPA courts can and
123
will look to pre-BAPCPA law to define "bad faith" in this context.
An argument can easily be made from pre-BAPCPA case law that
post-petition financial changes can be considered when determining
a debtor's intent in filing a petition for Chapter 7 relief.'2 4 Prior to
the enactment of the BAPCPA, the courts routinely read a good
faith requirement into § 707(a), but the
standards for a finding of
25
bad faith were varied and numerous.
It has been suggested elsewhere that manipulation of income or
expenses for the purposes of passing the means test now creates
another opportunity to find dishonesty on the part of debtors. 126 But
there is a possibility that this dishonesty may not show itself unless
could not include this expense in his means test calculations because the order was entered
post-petition, but he could have the court consider the payments as special circumstances to
rebut the presumption of abuse).
120. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88.
121. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(3)(A)-(B) (West 2006).
122. 368 B.R. 662 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).
123. See id. at 665-70.
124. Other dishonest post-petition behavior, however, continues to be punishable under §
727. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 727 (West 2006).
125. See In re Zick, 931 F.2d 1124, 1127 (6th Cir. 1991) ('The facts required to mandate
dismissal based upon a lack of good faith are as varied as the number of cases." (quoting In
re Bingham, 68 B.R. 933, 935 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1987))).
126. See Culhane & White, supranote 9, at 687-90.
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post-petition financial changes can be considered. For instance, if an
unemployed debtor files for Chapter 7 relief knowing that he may
soon be employed at a significant salary, a court should inquire into
the debtor's intentions in filing the petition. The court must
determine whether the debtor simply decided to seek relief out of a
desire to make an opportunistic filing that would allow him to set
aside considerable debt before his new job would foreclose this
opportunity. To conduct this inquiry, however, the post-petition
increase in income must be considered.
D. Post-PetitionChanges Relevant Under the Totality of the
CircumstancesTest
Although the phrase "totality of the circumstances" may seem to
directly answer the question of whether any post-petition changes
to a Chapter 7 debtor's income or expenses should be considered
under § 707(b)(3)(B), it actually does not. This is because the
provision does not state whether courts should consider the totality
of the circumstances as they exist on the petition date or as they
exist on the day of the hearing of the motion to dismiss under
§ 707(b). 2 7 That is not to say, however, that this test does not
indirectly answer the question.
As noted by the Fifth Circuit in Cortez, most of the handful of
circuit court decisions that considered a motion filed under the preBAPCPA version of § 707(b) applied the totality of circumstances
test.1 28 These courts typically considered the same factors in each
decision, such as the debtor's ability to pay his debts in a hypothetical Chapter 13 proceeding.' 29
Because so few decisions used the phrase "totality of the circumstances" in this context before Congress passed the BAPCPA, and
because those opinions that did tended to repeatedly consider the
same factors, courts can infer that Congress adopted the factors
127. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(3)(B) (West 2006). This provision states that if the
presumption of abuse does not arise under the means test or is rebutted, then the court shall
consider whether "the totality of the circumstances (including whether the debtor seeks to
reject a personal services contract and the financial need for such rejection as sought by the
debtor) of the debtor's financial situation demonstrates abuse." Id.
128. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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considered by the circuits that applied this test."'0 This would be
especially true of a factor considered by all or nearly all of the
circuits applying this test. If Congress wished to exclude a factor, it
could have expressly done so, just as it made sure to expressly
include a factor-the rejection of a personal services contract-in
the text of § 707(b)(3)(B). 3 '
One factor that would receive priority consideration under this
line of reasoning is the measurement of a debtor's ability to repay
his debts in a hypothetical Chapter 13 proceeding. This presumption
of priority consideration is further enhanced by the emphasis
Congress placed on measuring debtors' ability to repay their debts
in both the legislative history accompanying the BAPCPA and the
structure of the remainder of § 707(b), particularly the means
test. 132
Nearly all of the courts that have considered whether a Chapter
13 debtor's post-petition financial changes should be considered
under the post-BAPCPA version of Chapter 13 have concluded that
these changes should be considered to determine a debtor's fitness
for Chapter 13 relief 13 3 Thus, the same analysis used by the Fifth
Circuit in the Cortez case should be applied in post-BAPCPA cases
considering motions to dismiss Chapter 7 petitions under the
totality of the circumstances test.3 4 Because courts are required to
look to whether a debtor would be eligible for Chapter 13 relief
under the totality of the circumstances test, and because postpetition events are considered in a Chapter 13 proceeding, then
post-petition events must be considered here as well, up until the
last possible moment: the point at which the motion to dismiss the
debtor's petition under the § 707(b)(3)(B) totality of the circumstances test is decided. Seizing primarily on this reasoning, every
130. Wedoff makes essentially the same argument. See Wedoff, JudicialDiscretion,supra
note 9, at 1042 (stating the totality of the circumstances test codified in § 707(b)(3)(B)
necessarily includes consideration of a debtor's disposable income through a Chapter 13
proceeding, because this is a factor "on which the relevant case law had particularly focused").
131. See § 707(b)(3)(B).
132. See supra Part III.
133. See, e.g., Baxter v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 346 B.R. 256 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2006); In
re Demonica, 345 B.R. 895 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); In re Renicker, 342 B.R. 304 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 2006). But see In re Oliver, No. 06-30076-rldl3, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 1607 (Bankr. D. Or.
June 29, 2006). This is also in accord with the weight of pre-BAPCPA authority considering
this issue, as noted by the court in Cortez. See supranotes 60-63 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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court that has been faced with the question of whether to consider
a debtor's post-petition financial changes under the totality of the
circumstances test has held that it is appropriate to consider such
changes. 3 ' Because none of these decisions appear to have considered all possible arguments for and against considering a debtor's
post-petition financial changes under the totality of the circumstances test, however, this Note will also examine the other factors
that are relevant to this question.
There is a second relevant factor that was applied under preBAPCPA § 707(b) cases applying the totality of the circumstances
test: the totality of the circumstances test is equitable in nature. 3 '
Thus, unlike in the calculation of the means test, equitable considerations can and should be considered by a court applying this
provision. Application of this analysis shows that in most, but not
all, cases, it proves equitable to consider a Chapter 7 debtor's postpetition financial changes.
Most observers would agree it is fair and just to consider an
increase in monthly income that a debtor begins to receive after
filing his bankruptcy petition but before the deadline to file a
motion under § 707(b) passes. After all, why should a debtor, like
the one in Cortez, be able to get hired at a new job with an annual
salary of approximately $100,000 four days after filing his petition
for relief, and the bankruptcy court be forced to consider this
debtor's monthly income to be zero if he was previously unemployed? Alternatively, imagine a downtrodden debtor files a Chapter
7 petition. Then, imagine that this debtor, two days later, has a
stress-induced heart attack, resulting in an increase in future
medical care expenses for ongoing treatment. Surely it would be
inequitable for a bankruptcy court to be barred from considering
these increased expenses.'3 7
135. See, e.g., In re DePellegrini, 365 B.R. 830 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007); In re Henebury, 361
B.R. 595 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007); In re Lenton, 358 B.R. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006); In re
Richie, 353 B.R. 569, 576 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Pennington, 348 B.R. 647, 650
(Bankr. Del. 2006); In re Pak, 343 B.R. 239, 246 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006).
136. See Kornfield v. Schwartz (In re Kornfield), 164 F.3d 778, 784 (4th Cir. 1991) ("A
totality of circumstances inquiry is equitable in nature and the existence of an asset, even if
exempt from creditors, is relevant to a debtor's ability to pay his or her debts.").
137. The court in Penningtonmade a similar argument. See In re Pennington, 348 B.R. 647,
651 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) ("A ruling that the Court may only consider the Debtor's financial
situation at the time of filing would cut both ways. If a debtor incurred additional expenses
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But, considering a decrease in a Chapter 7 debtor's expenses is a
different matter, particularly if the debtor's expenses were already
reasonable.13 Consider a Chapter 7 debtor who desires to take sensible measures to reduce his monthly expenses after filing his
petition for relief, such as switching his children from a private
school to a public school, canceling a gym membership, or making
similar attempts to reduce monthly expenses. If reductions in
post-petition expenses are considered under the totality of the
circumstances, then debtors will likely feel compelled to avoid
making these sensible reductions until after their Chapter 7
discharge is granted. This result, effectively compelling debtors in
dire financial straits to avoid reducing their monthly expenses for
months, hardly seems to make sense.13 9
Because it is equitable to consider a debtor's post-petition financial changes in most cases, however, and because the courts are
unlikely to conclude that the totality of the circumstances test
allows for consideration of both post-petition changes in a debtor's
income and an increase in the debtor's expenses, but not a reduction
in the debtor's expenses, without clear direction from Congress to
this effect, any court that would analyze the question of whether to
consider post-petition changes under this test would likely conclude
it is equitable to consider all such changes.
There are also other arguments in support of ignoring a debtor's
post-petition financial changes under the totality of the circumstances test. For instance, it could be argued that because Congress
chose to ignore post-petition events under the means test-when
it could have chosen to consider such changes-then the courts
should infer that Congress did not intend post-petition events to be

post-petition (for example, he needed a new car or had additional unexpected medical
expenses), the Court would not be able to consider it.").
138. Nearly all expenses that are allowed to be deducted from current monthly income
must be "reasonable" under the means test. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(V) (West
2006). The only exception is for secured debts, which are not dischargeable in a Chapter 7
proceeding. See id.
139. This argument borrows from Judge Lynn's observation in the Cortez case that some
debtors may delay looking for employment until after their bankruptcy case is decided if postpetition events are considered under § 707(b). See supranotes 48-49 and accompanying text.
Whereas the hypothetical provided by Judge Lynn smells of bad faith on the part of the
debtor, though, the same can hardly be said of debtors who simply try to cut back on their
monthly spending.
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14
considered under the totality of the circumstances test either. 1
This argument would likely fail if tried in court, however, because
it assumes Congress simply adopted the phrase "totality of the
circumstances" without knowing what factors the courts that had
used this phrase in the past considered under "totality of the
circumstances," or at least failed to realize the result of applying
these factors to a scenario involving post-petition changes to a
debtor's financial situation.14 ' The courts are unlikely to embrace
this assumption. For this same reason, the courts are also unlikely
to embrace any policy argument that post-petition changes should
not be considered for efficiency reasons.'4 2
Embracing the view that a Chapter 7 debtor's post-petition financial changes should be considered under the totality of the circumstances test also is consistent with Congress's goals in adopting
the BAPCPA, because doing so will tend to make it harder for most
Chapter 7 debtors to obtain relief. Both the overall theme of the
changes to § 707(b), particularly the removal of the presumption
in favor of granting a debtor relief from § 707(b)(1), 4 3 and the
legislative history accompanying the BAPCPA clearly show that
44
Congress intended to make it harder to obtain Chapter 7 relief.

V. A PROPOSAL
The primary purpose of this Note is to provide debtors, creditors,
lawyers, and the courts with guidance when they are faced with
interpreting whether a debtor's post-petition changes can be
140. This is a twist on the argument made by Professors Culhane and White in their
article, cited above, that was published shortly after the BAPCPA was adopted. See Culhane
& White, supra note 9, at 666-67, 677-82. Professors Culhane and White argue that
Congress's intent in adopting the means test was to make it the only test in § 707(b) that
would consider a debtor's ability to pay off debts. Id. The courts have since unanimously
rejected this interpretation, however, so this argument is not considered further in its original
form within this Note.
141. As discussed above, this Note asserts that Congress understood what it meant to
statutorily adopt the "totality of the circumstances" test. See supra notes 129-30 and
accompanying text.
142. As one practitioner has observed in commenting on the Cortez decision, requiring
courts to consider a debtor's post-petition financial changes may impose a significant
investigatory burden on U.S. trustees. See Dion, supra note 9, at 47-48.
143. See supra text accompanying note 77.
144. See supra Part III.A.
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considered under the new § 707(b). In this Part, however, this Note
goes beyond merely interpreting the existing statute; it sets forth a
pair of recommendations to change the existing law.'4 5
A. Expressly State When Courts Should ConsiderPost-Petition
Changes in § 707(b)
The current text of § 707(b) has clearly produced confusion in the
bankruptcy bar and among the U.S. trustees tasked with seeking
dismissal of cases under the section.' 4 6 If these highly respected
members of the legal community are at times unsure whether postpetition events can be considered under the various parts of the
section, then the confusion on the part of the counsel for indigent,
consumer Chapter 7 debtors surely must be just as great or worse.
The debtors represented by these counsel deserve greater clarity.
This clarity, moreover, can easily be supplied by amending § 707(b)
to clearly and unequivocally state when a debtor's post-petition
financial changes should and should not be considered in the
various parts of the section. By doing this, § 707(b) will be brought
in line with the host of other Bankruptcy Code sections that clearly
articulate whether post-petition events are relevant therein."'
Making this change will also prevent the need to litigate this
question at the expense of indigent Chapter 7 debtors.
B. Insert a De Minimis Exception
As noted above, considering post-petition changes in a Chapter 7
debtor's financial circumstances under the totality of the circum-

145. The changes made by the BAPCPA have been widely criticized by bankruptcy
practitioners, and even many of the nation's bankruptcy judges, because many in both groups
feel they were shut out of the drafting process by Congress in order to cater to the consumer
credit lobby. See, e.g., Jack B. Schmetterer et al., BAPCPA: What Do We Know and When Did
We Know It?, 4 DEPAuL Bus. & COM. L.J. 597, 597, 600 (saying "the bankruptcy community,
the bench and the bar, were effectively shut out of this particular bankruptcy bill" and that
BAPCPA "is badly drafted, shabbily drafted, carelessly drafted"). This criticism, as well as the
recent political changes in Congress, makes another package of revisions to the Bankruptcy
Code possible in the next several years. As a result, the statutory changes recommended by
this Note are particularly timely.
146. See supra Part IV.
147. See supranotes 42-43, 65-66 and accompanying text.
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stances test makes sense in most cases.148 From a policy standpoint,
it is wise to evaluate post-petition changes in a debtor's income; this
ensures that debtors whose income may have significantly improved
after the filing of their petition are not able to walk away from debts
unnecessarily, and also insures that struggling debtors who see
decreases in their income will be more likely to receive bankruptcy
relief. 149 Public policy also dictates that the courts should consider
post-petition increases in a debtor's monthly expenses. It would be
inherently unfair to dismiss a petition for Chapter 7 relief without
considering additional financial
hardships the debtor has incurred
150
since filing his petition.
Given the drawbacks to considering some post-petition reductions
in a debtor's expenses discussed above, however, the same cannot be
said of considering this type of post-petition change. Considering
reductions in a debtor's expenses will likely force debtors to refrain
from making sensible decisions to control their spending until after
their petitions for relief have been granted.1 5 '
To avoid these problems, Congress should amend the totality of
the circumstances test and bad faith provision in § 707(b)(3) to
include a de minimis exception. This amendment should prevent
judicial consideration, for the purposes of the totality of the
circumstances test, of post-petition decreases in a debtor's monthly
expenses to the extent these decreases do not exceed 10 percent of
the debtor's monthly expenses allowed under either the means test
or the total monthly expenses allowed to rebut a presumption of
abuse if special circumstances exist, whichever is greater. 152 It
should also make clear that aggregate reductions in monthly
expenses of 10 percent or less after the filing of the petition should
not be considered for the purposes of a bad faith finding.
This proposal has a basis in both pre- and post-BAPCPA law. The
Schedule I form in effect prior to the BAPCPA-the form debtors
used to detail their current income-asked debtors to "[d]escribe any
increase or decrease of more than 10% in any of the above categories
148. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
149. See supra text accompanying note 136.
150. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
152. Of course, the expenses allowed to rebut the presumption of abuse by showing special
circumstances would always be the greater of the two, should special circumstances exist.
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anticipated to occur within the year following the filing of this
document." ' This instruction implies that changes of less than 10
percent should be ignored. So, while a 10 percent threshold may
seem arbitrary to some, it is not the first time such a threshold
would be used in connection with § 707(b). Moreover, other provisions of the current Bankruptcy Code also recognize de minimis
exceptions.' 4 Considering changes in monthly expenses that exceed
this 10 percent de minimis threshold, however, will ensure that
debtors who may have been living too comfortably-that is, those
who have plenty of unnecessary expenses they can reduce-will not
escape an abuse inquiry.
CONCLUSION

The issue of whether a Chapter 7 debtor's post-petition financial
changes can be considered by a court hearing a motion to dismiss
the debtor's petition for relief under § 707(b) is unlikely to be settled
anytime soon. The first bankruptcy courts faced with this question
have given inconsistent answers to it, and those that have given the
same answer have taken different analytical paths in reaching their
conclusions. These courts have also failed to consider all possible
arguments for and against considering post-petition changes, and
no appellate courts have had the opportunity to clarify the situation.
This Note can be used to help debtors, creditors, practitioners,
and, ultimately, the courts resolve this complicated issue. This Note
concludes that the courts cannot consider post-petition financial
changes under the means test provisions of § 707(b), but it concludes
that the courts should consider such changes to rebut the presumption of abuse created by the means test, to determine whether a
debtor filed a petition for relief in bad faith under § 707(b)(3)(A) and
153. Official Form B61, Dec. 2003, available at httpJ/www.uscourts.gov/bkforms/
officiallb6i.pdf. The current Schedule I form, like the current Schedule J form that is used to
detail a debtor's expenses, has done away with this 10 percent threshold. Both forms now
instruct debtors to "[d]escribe any increase or decrease in expenditures reasonably anticipated
to occur within the year following the filing of this document." Official Form B6, Oct. 2006,
availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/BK _Forms_06_Official/Form_6I_1006_revised.pdf;
Official Form B6J, Oct. 2006, available at http:/lwww.uscourts.gov/rules/BKForms-06_Official/Form_6J_1006.pdf.
154. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(9) (West 2006) (prohibiting parties from recovering
transfers of less than $5,000 in a preference action).
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to administer the totality of the circumstances test in § 707(b)(3)(B).
This Note also recommends that Congress intervene to expressly
adopt these results in the text of § 707(b), but modify them so that
debtors can exempt some post-petition reductions in expenses
from judicial consideration for the purposes of a good faith inquiry
or the totality of the circumstances test. Applying existing law
properly, coupled with the addition of these recommendations, will
ensure that post-petition changes are always considered in a fair
and efficient manner by the courts.
Justin H. Rucki*

* My deepest thanks to Peter A. Alces, Rita Anne Rollins Professor of Law at the William
& Mary School of Law, for allowing me to assist with his revisions to THE LAW OF
FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS. Through this work, I discovered my interest in bankruptcy law.
I also wish to thank Katie Clair and Rich Thomas for providing helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this Note, and my friend Thomas Whiteside for drawing my attention to a case of
first impression-In re Cortez.

